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Abstract
Language and cultural diversity is a fundamental aspect of the present world.
We study three modern multilingual societies -the Basque Country, Ireland
and Wales- which are endowed with two, linguistically distant, official lan-
guages: A, spoken by all individuals, and B, spoken by a bilingual minority.
In the three cases it is observed a decay in the use of minoritarian B, a sign
of diversity loss. However, for the Council of Europe the key factor to avoid
the shift of B is its use in all domains. Thus, we investigate the language
choices of the bilinguals by means of an evolutionary game theoretic model.
We show that the language population dynamics has reached an evolution-
ary stable equilibrium where a fraction of bilinguals have shifted to speak A.
Thus, this equilibrium captures the decline in the use of B. To test the theory
we build empirical models that predict the use of B for each proportion of
bilinguals. We show that model-based predictions fit very well the observed
use of Basque, Irish, and Welsh.1
Keywords: economics of language, language use game, evolutionary stability,
threatened languages.
JEL codes: Z1, H89, C72, C57
∗Geneva School of Economics and Management, Universite´ de Gene`ve, Bd du Pont d’Arve 40,
CH-1211 Gene`ve, Suisse. E-mail address: stefan.sperlich@unige.de.
†Corresponding author: University of the Basque Country, Departamento de Fundamentos del
Ana´lisis Econo´mico I, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Basque Country-Spain.
E-mail address: jr.uriarte@ehu.es
1This joint work started while Jose´-Ramo´n Uriarte was visiting the Humbolt-Universita¨t zu
Berlin and the University of Geneva. He would like to thank the generous hospitality of both
universities. Financial support provided by the Basque Government, by the Ministerio de Economı´a
y Competitividad (ECO2012-31626, ECO2016-76203-C2-1-P), and by the Santander Financial
Institute are gratefully acknowledged.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
11
60
4v
1 
 [e
co
n.E
M
]  
30
 A
ug
 20
19
1 Introduction
As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity
is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. UNESCO
(2002), Article 1.
The present work deals with the issue of preserving language and cultural diversity
in highly developed multilingual societies having two linguistically distant2 official
languages: A, denoting the language spoken by all individuals, and B, denoting the
one spoken by a bilingual minority. Some examples of advanced multilingual soci-
eties with distant official languages and bilingual minorities are the Basque Country,
Ireland and Wales. They are endowed with enough resources to design and imple-
ment well-articulated language policies in favour of B, which means, among other
things, that they have a public bilingual educational system (see Mercator, 2008,
2014, 2016), media, and markets for cultural goods related with language B. The
idea is that these multilingual societies will set a kind of benchmark into the set of
societies with threatened languages contemplated in Fishman (2001). The transmis-
sion of bilingual cultural traits in these multilingual societies works, fundamentally,
through the public educational system (parents send their children to the public
system to receive a bilingual education, so that they learn the two official languages
A and B). Thus, the institutions in charge of the cultural transmission generate a
continuous flow of potentially bilingual individuals.
Cultural transmission was formally studied by Cavalli-Sforzza and Feldman (1981)
by means of an evolutionary biology-based model, in a society with two cultural
traits distributed in the population. Their model produces two stable equilibria,
each allowing the survival of just one trait, and one unstable equilibrium where
the two traits are present. Thus, the model did not capture well the diversity
observed in certain societies, particularly in those with minoritarian cultural groups.
Bisin and Verdier (2001, 2010), extended the Cavalli-Sforzza and Feldman model
avoiding the boundary equilibria, and allowing for a stable interior equilibrium where
the two traits can coexist in the population state. The present work adopts an
evolutionary game-theoretic approach, free of biological constraints, to study the
population dynamics of cultural traits represented by the two official languages, A
and B3. However, we do not study language and culture transmission. Instead,
2See Ginsburgh and Weber (2011) for a survey on how to compute the distance between two
languages; see also Desmet et al. (2009).
3We will model the population dynamics by means of the replicator dynamics. Even though the
origin of the replicator equation is in biology (Maynard Smith, 1982), it has been shown that, in
socio-economic contexts, it can be obtained from diverse trial-and-error learning procedures (see,
among others, Binmore et al.,1995, Cabrales, 2000, Cabrales and Uriarte, 2013, and Schlag, 1998).
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we concentrate our analysis on the weakening of bilingual cultural traits that are
observed in the data about the use of Basque, Irish and Welsh.
The data show that despite the existing proportions of speakers in those languages,
the use of B is lagging far behind. This seems to be a paradox in societies having
a strong policy in favour of B. Why is it that having the political system – that is,
elected governments promoting the use of B – the legal instruments to facilitate its
use4, resources, bilingual educational systems, and the bilinguals’ preference for B,
that the same people make a low use of B? Why is it that, knowing the Council of
Europe’s 5 advice that the key factor to avoid a minority language shift is that B
should be used in all social domains, speakers of B often use A when they interact
between them, putting at risk the existence of B and its related culture?
The purpose of this work is to analyse the source of this paradox which, adopting
the Council of Europe’s view, must be the process by which bilinguals decide the
language to use in each interaction. Our view is that the survival of language
B depends, essentially, on the bilingual individuals, i.e. on how intense is their
preference for using B in their interactions.
Without denying the links with the cultural transmission literature, our work is
closer to the literature about endangered minority languages and cultural diversity.
This is a topic widely studied by sociolinguists (e.g. Fishman 1991, 2001; see a
description of language death process in Crystal, 2000 ), and by physicists and
mathematicians working in complex systems (Abrams and Strogatz, 2003 is the
seminal work; see, among others, Stauffer and Schulze, 2005, Minett and Wang,
2008, Sole´ et al., 2010; this approach is surveyed in Patriarca et al., 2012). These
two schools frame the process of threatening and eroding cultural diversity in the
context of language competition dynamics. That is, natural languages, with their
speech communities, are viewed as competing for speakers, very much like firms
compete for market shares6. Surprisingly, this competitive situation has received
little attention from economic theorists and from game theory practitioners7. Our
framework uses notions and analytical tools of behavioural economics, to study the
language competition between A and B, avoiding some undesirable features of both
4The Law of Normalisation of Basque’s Use of 1982; the Welsh Language Measure of 2011; and
the recognition by Constitution of the Republic of Ireland that Irish as the first official language.
5European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang
6As remarked by Nelde (1995) ”neither contact nor conflict can occur between languages; they
are conceivable only between speakers of languages and between the language communities”.
7“The lack of economic analysis of the natural language that characterizes human economic
behaviour is certainly a large and visible hole”. Anderlini and Felli (2004). Notable exceptions
are Rubinstein (2000) and Selten and Pool (1991). Grin et al. (2010) and Ginsburgh and Weber
(2011) are recent surveys of the research developed in the economics of language.
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sociolinguistics and the formal and complex systems approach. In sociolinguistics
it is the lack of formalization that may help to throw light into the complexities
of language competition. Physicists and mathematicians have yet to extend their
models to allow for adaptive decision makers giving rise to more realistic population
dynamics and behavioural results. These drawbacks are eluded by our model.
We highlight two factors that condition the bilinguals’ language choices. One is the
information that bilingual individuals have about the linguistic types (bilingual or
monolingual) of the interactive partners. Very likely, that information was perfect
in the past; in small, traditional communities with low immigration and mobility.
However, in modern societies bilinguals are spread all over the country, particularly
in urban areas8, where interactions are frequently anonymous, and the linguistic type
tends to be private information. Thus, bilinguals must often choose the language of
interaction without (perfect) information on the interlocutor’s linguistic type. The
other factor is that in these societies there is what is called a language contact situ-
ation (Nelde, 1995 and Winford, 2003) which means that the languages spoken by
bilinguals are being altered, particularly B, due to the constant interaction between
bilinguals and monolinguals using the majority language A.
We assume that bilinguals choose the language of interaction through an extended
version of the Language Use Game (LUG) which is based on a game introduced
by Iriberri and Uriarte (2012) (IU henceforth). The LUG is a game with imperfect
information of linguistic types, in which bilinguals may choose between two pure
strategies, either Reveal(R) the bilingual type or Hide(H) it. Imperfect informa-
tion and language contact leave a tight room to satisfy the preference for the use ofB.
Under these circumstances, bilinguals are bound to make frequent language choices,
giving rise to unconscious patterns of choice behaviour. Thus, we assume that the
bilinguals play continuously the LUG, and learn by a trial-and-error adjustment
process, modelled by the one-player replicator dynamics attached to the LUG. We
show that this dynamic process converges into an interior evolutionary stable Nash
equilibrium. This kind of equilibria are considered as conventions (Weibull, 1995).
Therefore, in the context of the LUG, this equilibrium would be a linguistic conven-
tion in which the bilingual population is partitioned in two groups. One group is
composed of those who choose R; they will always speak B with any bilingual. The
other group is composed by by those who choose H: they speak A between them.
Thus, this equilibrium provides a theoretical explanation of the observed decline in
the use of B. To test empirically this theory, we first make the Nash equilibrium to
8More than half of the Basque speakers live in the six most populated towns of the Country.
Similarly, 75.7 % of Welsh speakers live in towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Irish speakers
outside the Gaeltacht are a minority, raised and educated through Irish, living in urban areas.
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depend on the proportion of bilinguals, α ∈ (0, 1), and then we build econometric
models that predict, for each α, the rate of use of B in equilibrium. Finally, the
predictions are compared with the observed use of Basque, Irish, and Welsh. The
main finding is that the predictions fit well the observed data. This is confirmed
when testing them with nonparametric (i.e. model-free) data fits. Moreover, where
data are available over time we see that the functions change quite smoothly.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the gen-
eral framework of the LUG. Section 3 we extend the LUG introducing behavioural
assumptions to build a Nash equilibrium function that depends on the proportion
of bilingual speakers. In Section 4 we test the model for the Basque Country, Ire-
land and Wales. Section 5 concludes, summarizing results and pointing out policy
measures. Section 6 contains the Appendix.
2 The Theoretical Framework
We will be dealing with economically advanced multilingual societies having two
official languages, denoted A and B. We assume that in those societies there are
essentially two linguistic groups: the monolingual speakers, who speak only A, and
a minority of bilingual speakers who speak, with similar skills, A and B9. Let α > 0
denote the proportion of bilingual speakers in the society, and 1− α the proportion
of monolinguals. We assume α < 1 − α, and α ∈ (0, 1).10 The first assumption we
make says that communication takes place in a single language, either A or B.
A.1. The Languages with official status, A and B, are linguistically distant so
that successful communication is only possible when the interaction takes place in
one language.
Individuals are therefore assumed to view A and B having the same status. We
show below that A.1 is consistent with the data. Passive bilinguals, i.e. those who
understand B but cannot speak it, are, therefore, not considered (or can be treated
as monolinguals; see empirical part). When a monolingual interacts with a bilingual,
they necessarily use A. Thus, B is spoken only if two bilinguals meet, and at least
one signals the desire to speak in B. Hence, language choice is not trivial.
Some examples of societies with official languages satisfying A.1 are the Basque
Country, Ireland and Wales. Basque is a pre-indoeuropean language in contact with
the two Romance languages, Spanish (or Castellano) and French. Irish and Welsh,
9It should be clear from the outset that we are referring only to bilingual speakers in the two
‘internal’ official languages A and B.
10The boundary numbers 0 and 1 are hardly representatives.
5
two Celtic languages, are in contact with the Germanic language English. These
are competitive multilingual societies, both in the economic domain, and in the
linguistic domain, with sufficient resources to implement well articulated language
policies to protect and transmit B through the educational system. Thus, we will
analyse theoretically and empirically the factors that might affect the use of B in
multilingual societies which are highly developed economically. Our view is that
these societies form a kind of benchmark multilingual societies in the set of all
societies with threatened languages satisfying A.1. If minority languages will be
shifted there, this will even be more so in the less developed multilingual societies.
We may measure the use of B in different ways. We can measure the frequency of
use of B (say, daily, weekly, less often, never) as it is done in the censi and surveys
about the Irish and Welsh languages. Or we may measure the use of B in the streets,
as it is done for Basque. For Irish and Welsh we use observations about the Daily
Use (DU), for Basque we have the observations of Street Use (KE); see Appendix
6.1 for details, and how α, KE and DU are defined.
Table 1: Evolution of percentage of bilinguals α and Street Use or Daily Use for
Basque, Irish and Welsh. For Basque, α and KE was not always measured in the
same year; e.g. 1991/3 indicates that α is from 91, KE from 93. For Welsh, the
surveys were executed over longer periods.
Basque Irish Welsh
Year 100α 100KE Year 100α 100DU Years 100α 100DU
1991/3 22.3 11.8
1996/7 24.4 13.0 1996 41.10 10.16
2001 25.4 13.3 2002 41.88 09.05
2006 25.7 13.7 2006 40.83 02.10 2004-06 20.5 13.0
2011 27.0 13.3 2011 40.60 02.15
2016 28.4 12.6 2013-14 19.0 10.1
Clearly, KE and DU will be modelled differently, but we suppose that both result
from the same language game, and are functions of the same factors. Table 1 shows
α, KE or DU , for the case of Basque, Irish, and Welsh for different years. Some
features of the numbers are worth mentioning. While α is either steadily increasing
(for Basque and Welsh) or on a very high level (Irish), the use of B is lagging behind,
stagnating or even going down. Note that we observe a structural break of DU for
Irish between 2002 and 2006. This may be due to the fact that only since 2006 the
daily use of Irish is clearly defined as “used outside the education system”. In Table
6
1 only the aggregates are given; for the empirical study we will use the data taken
on small area level exhibiting the joint variation of α and language use.
The bilingual population in each country displays an empirical regularity that is
commonly observed in social groups: that the bilingual individuals tend to behave
similarly (not identically, as we will see below in the equilibrium analysis of section
2.1.4) with respect to the use of language B. This universal regularity is, for Manski
(1997), the result of a type of social process called anonymous endogenous interac-
tions. It is a social process in which the behaviour of an individual varies with the
distribution of behaviour in the reference group. The endogeneity of interactions
will be formalized below by means of the replicator dynamics equation associated
to the game played by the bilingual population.
2.1 A Game- Theoretic Model of Language Choice
We seek to understand the data of B use. To this end, we model the strategic
manner by which the members of bilingual population choose, at the beginning
of an interaction, the language to use with the interactive partners. Bilinguals
are assumed to choose only pure strategies, and adjust their choices endogenously
by trial-and-error learning procedures. We will show that this adaptive process
converges into a Nash equilibrium with the properties of a linguistic convention.
2.1.1 Anonymous Interactions in Modern Multilingual Societies
A feature of modern societies is the mobility, both social and geographical, of the
work force. As a consequence, interactions become increasingly anonymous. In
the benchmark multilingual societies, the spread of bilinguals across the layers of
society would mean that frequently bilinguals participate in interactions without
recognizing each other, because the linguistic types (bilingual or monolingual) have
become private information11.
A key source of that imperfect information, that enhances the one derived from
modernization, is the behaviour of the bilingual individuals themselves. For Nelde
(1995) ”contact between languages always involves an element of conflict”. More
specifically, if a monolingual is addressed in B, or observes an interactive partner
who is signalling the desire to speak in B, then the monolingual is forced to re-
veal his type, and must confess his lack of knowledge of B. However, the need of
communication will frustrate the bilingual’s desire, who, by A.1, will also be forced
11In a very different context, but related with natural language issues, see how language compe-
tence is made private information in Blume and Board (2013).
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to switch, sometimes reluctantly, to A. This might create a tension between the
interactants (not free of political undertones, in certain cases) that could interfere
the final goal of the interaction. Thus, sending signals conveying the intention to
speak in B might be harmful for both sides12. Bilinguals experience frequently this
kind of interaction. However, given their linguistic flexibility, a growing proportion
of them tend to avoid the potential tensions with unknown interlocutors, and choose
to speak A, mistakenly arguing that it is not polite to start with B (see Amorrortu
et al., 2009 for the case of Basque). Therefore, the politeness induced choice be-
haviour preserves the imperfect information about linguistic types. Further, this
behaviour is reinforced if the probability of meeting a monolingual is much higher
than meeting a bilingual; that is, because 1− α > α.
We should also mention a new breed of bilinguals, called “new speakers”, who have
learnt the minority language by means other than the family transmission, essentially
through immersion learning models in the educational system. These newcomers are
inclined to deny themselves as “authentic” and legitimate speakers of B as compared
to the native speakers, even though they are fully competent in language B. They
feel insecure with B, and tend to not use it outside the school, thus, hiding their
bilingual type to interlocutors. See Ortega and al. (2015) for Basque, O’Rourke and
Ramallo (2011) for Irish, and Selleck (2018), for Welsh.
Additional sources of anonymity, among others, are: (a) the continuous contact and
interaction with speakers of language A erase some revealing signals of B speakers,
such as the accents. The contact situation makes both bilinguals and monolinguals
to have a similar accent, which is shaped by the dominant language13; (b) Second
and third generations of immigrants learn language B in the public educational
system. Thus, differences in ethnic features, if any, hardly reveal the linguistic type.
Thus the anonymity of interactions is the result of a combination of several sources.
We are then led to conclude that it is realistic to assume that in the benchmark
multilingual societies linguistic types are, often, private information14.
A.2. Imperfect information: The participants of an interaction do not have,
ex-ante, any information about the linguistic type (bilingual or monolingual) of each
other. They only know the average proportion of bilingual and monolingual speakers,
12We could observe the subtleties of this potential conflict by means of linguistic politeness theory
(see Brown and Levinson, 1987). For a detailed discussion on this, see Uriarte (2017).
13For example, in the Spanish side of the Basque Country, bilingual and monolingual people
have similar Spanish accent, while in the French side they have a French accent.
14To avoid this, Welsh speakers may wear the Cymraeg badges of the Welsh Language Comission.
There are also badges for Welsh learners, as well as lanyards and email footer, etc. This does
not exist in the Basque Country, probably because it would be politically controversial. Signs
announcing that Basque is spoken in official buildings, banks and shops are fairly common though.
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α and (1− α) respectively, of the society and that 0 < α < (1− α).15
Remark: One may argue that it is very likely that the street use of B occurs
also in assortative matching. But any econometric model (such as the ones we
estimate later) is a trade-off between a simplifying economic model and reality. We
may account for assortative matchings by introducing a parameter p denoting the
proportion of random matches and 1− p that of assortative matchings of bilinguals.
We did this in an earlier version of the work, but the additional parameter p did
neither lead to deeper insights nor to better fits16.
2.1.2 Linguistic Preferences and Payoffs
The fact that language B has become official reflects not only that linguistic rights
of the minority language speakers are respected, but also that bilinguals manifest a
preference for communication in language B. We may assume that this linguistic
preference could be weighted by a proper choice of payoffs. Payoffs are assumed to
represent net communication benefits (see Selten and Pool, 1991, and Selten and
Warglien, 2007). A monolingual speaker cannot make language choices; thus, as-
suming that every individual has the same language competence and communication
skills in A, a monolingual speaker will get a sure payoff n. Since language choices
are made under imperfect information, a bilingual may choose voluntarily language
A. In that case, we assume that he gets the payoff n. Bilingual speakers will get the
maximum payoff, m, when they coordinate in their preferred language B. However,
(n − c) > 0 would be the payoff to a bilingual speaker who, having chosen B, is
matched to a monolingual, and therefore is forced to switch to A. Then c denotes
the frustration cost. In sum:
A.3. Language preferences and Payoffs: bilingual speakers prefer to use
language B. Further, it holds m > n > c > 0, and that the frustration cost is
smaller than the weighted benefits, i.e. c < (m− n) α
(1−α) = b(α).
15We assume that bilinguals know the average proportion α of bilinguals in the society because
a summary of sociolinguistic statistics are periodically published, and talked about in the media.
Note that Catalan is a minority language inside the Spanish State, but inside Catalunya, out of
a population of 7,496,27, roughly α = 76% speak Catalan and 86% understand it. Further, since
A.1 is not satisfied between Castellano and Catalan, and there is common knowledge that ‘almost’
all individuals speak or understand Catalan, there is no hindering of the flow of a conversation nor
any tension caused by starting in Catalan with unknown interlocutors. Hence, neither A.1 nor
A.2 apply. Similarly, the theories developed for Catalan would not apply here, see IDESCAT.
16Say, by introducing the parameter p, the empirical Model 2, that predicts the street use of B,
described below, would be pα2(x∗)2 + (1− p)α2.
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2.1.3 The Language Use Game (LUG)
Under the assumptions A1-A.3, bilinguals, at the beginning of an interaction, may
take a decision about the language to be used in the interaction. An ordinary
conversation has a sequential nature. Therefore, the choice of language is better
described by a game in extensive form, such as the game of IU (Iriberri and Uriarte,
2012). For empirical purposes we present now its strategic form (which will be
extended in Section 3). Under the assumptions A.1-A.3, the bilinguals’ language
strategic behaviour is captured by the following pure strategies of bilinguals:
R: Reveal always your type, so that you will speak B whenever you meet a bilingual.
H: Hide your type, and reveal it only when matched with an R-player. That is,
speak A, and switch to B only when you are addressed in B.
IU show the sequential nature of these two strategies. As a speaker (i.e. as the
interactant who starts the conversation) or as listener (i.e. the one who comes after
the speaker) an R chooser will try to use B (sending signals of wanting to use B)
to discover the interlocutor’s linguistic type, so that B will be used when he meets
another bilingual17. In this event he will get the maximum pay-off m; but in the
event of meeting a monolingual he gets (n − c). An H player will choose A in the
role of speaker. Whereas, as a listener, he will answer in the language used by
the speaker, either A or B. Therefore an H chooser avoids the cost c, and when
he meets an R chooser he will get m. The essence of H is that it reinforces the
imperfect information. When two bilinguals who choose H meet, they will speak
in A. Language B will be spoken whenever two bilinguals meet, and, at least, one
of them chooses R. An H chooser behaves like a monolingual in disguise unless
he is discovered by an R chooser. Clearly H is less demanding than R (recall the
arguments for the imperfect information assumptions).
There are two states of nature: Bilingual and Monolingual. When the Bilingual
state is realized, two bilingual agents meet and play the game described by the two-
by-two matrix on the left side of Figure 1. Each cell in this matrix lists the pay-off
to the row and column players in lower case letters (m or n), and, for each strategy
combination, the resulting language of the interaction, shown in capital letters (A
or B). When the Monolingual state is realized the bilingual meets a monolingual
and, depending on the strategy chosen, gets the pay-off shown by the column on the
right side of Figure 1. In this state, the language of conversation is A, regardless of
the bilingual’s strategy.18 At the start of the game a state is realized. Bilinguals do
17When an interlocutor is addressed in B, he would feel forced, by A.1 and A.3, to confess his
linguistic type (monolingual or bilingual). A monolingual might feel unconfortable in this situation.
18We skip the matching of two monolingual speakers since it is irrelevant, and only show the
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not know the state when they choose a pure strategy. They hold beliefs assigning
probability α to the state Bilingual and probability 1−α to the state Monolingual.
Therefore, a bilingual expects to meet another bilingual with probability α, and a
monolingual speaker with probability 1− α. This comes from assumption A.2.
Probability α Probability 1− α
R H
R m,m;B m,m;B R n− c;A
H m,m;B n, n; A H n; A
State Bilingual State Monolingual
Figure 1: The Language Use Game.
2.1.4 The Language Use Game as a Population Game
Assumptions A.1 and A.2 joint with the close contact with monolinguals capture
the conditions under which bilinguals must make their language choices. Then the
bilinguals’ linguistic preferences (A.3) lead them to make frequent language choices,
aiming to get an efficient communication and the coordination in their preferred
language B. Theoretically, we may view the LUG not as a one-shot game, but as
a game played continuously by bilinguals.19 In this manner, we have converted the
LUG into a game played by the bilingual population.
Bilinguals learn by a trial-and-error adjustment process, based on imitation and in-
teractive learning (i.e. endogenous interactions). At each moment of time there is
a population state (NR/N,NH/N), where N denotes the total number of bilinguals
(we suppress time in the notation), and Ni/N represents the share of bilinguals play-
ing pure strategy i, (i = R,H). The continuous play of the LUG produce changes
in the population state and in the payoffs to the pure strategies, resulting in a pop-
ulation dynamics in continuous time, the one-player population replicator dynamics
attached to the LUG (see Appendix 6.2). The replicators are the pure strategies R
and H. This version of the replicator dynamics assumes that bilinguals will choose
only pure strategies. Let x denote the proportion of bilingual speakers who choose
to play R. Under A.1-A.3, and a given α ∈ (0, 1), the bilingual player popula-
tion‘s adjustment process converges into the unique evolutionary stable equilibrium
bilingual’s payoffs. When looking at the language use data, the matches of monolinguals are taken
into account, as they are a part of our observations.
19The game is played through pairwise random matches. That is, pairs of individuals are repeat-
edly drawn at random to play the game through which the language of interaction is determined.
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of the LUG, denoted x∗. This is the only asymptotically stable equilibrium in the
associated one-population replicator dynamics:
x∗ = 1− (1− α)c
α(m− n) , x
∗ ∈ (0, 1). (1)
There are two additional Nash equilibria, (R,H) and (H,R), both unstable, and
the language of interaction in both equilibria is B, see also Appendix 6.2.
In social or economic contexts, an evolutionary stable equilibrium, such as x∗, can be
thought of as a convention (Weibull, 1995). Thus, the population dynamics attached
to the LUG converges into a linguistic convention.20 This linguistic convention
takes the form of a partition of the bilingual population in two groups. The group
Nx∗ = N∗R consists of all the bilinguals who have chosen the pure strategy R in
equilibrium. The other group, N(1 − x∗) = N∗H , consists of all the bilinguals who
have chosen the pure strategy H in equilibrium.21
Any member of N∗R will speak in B whenever he meets a bilingual. However, when
a bilingual of the group N∗H meets another bilingual of the same group, they will
speak in A. They will use B only when they encounter a bilingual of the N∗R group.
The theoretical finding is described in the following proposition:
Proposition: Under the assumptions A1-A.3, and the exogenously given parameters
α ∈ (0, 1),m, n and c, the population dynamics (or equivalently, the language use
population dynamics) attached to the LUG converges into an evolutionary stable
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, (x∗, 1− x∗) = (N∗R/N,N∗H/N). This equilibrium is
a linguistic convention which, since x∗ > 0, includes a degree of erosion in the use
of B: the smaller the value of x∗, the higher the matching probability (1−x∗)(1−x∗)
of two bilinguals who have shifted to speak A.
According to this Proposition, the observed low levels of language B use could be
theoretically explained by a convention with a relatively high proportion of bilinguals
choosing H in equilibrium, 1−x∗. It may happen that, for values of x∗ ∈ (0, 0.293),
the matching probability between bilinguals who will use A will be higher than the
matching probability of bilinguals who will use B: (1−x∗)(1−x∗) > x∗×x∗+x∗(1−
x∗) + (1 − x∗)x∗. As any other convention (Young, 1995), the linguistic one, will
become a self-enforcing mechanism of language coordination, hard to remove, which
could extend to domains where information is not private, such as family, friends,
20The one-shot play analysis of standard game theory will not capture the strong stability features
of x∗ which are relevant in our analysis.
21Hence, the equilibrium (x∗, 1−x∗), instead of being interpreted as a randomization performed
by each and every bilingual, it is interpreted as a population state (N∗R/N,N
∗
H/N). They are both
equivalent; see Weibull (1995).
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and assortative matchings22. The strong stability properties of x∗ allow us to make
the following hypothesis to understand the use of B reflected in the data:
Hypothesis 1. For a given proportion of bilinguals α ∈ (0, 1), and payoffs m, n
and c, the evolutionary stable mixed strategy Nash equilibrium x∗could be thought of
as a theoretical representation (that is, a model) of the fraction of bilingual speakers
who, in real-life-situations, use language B whenever they meet a bilingual.
We have data about the precise proportions of those who have the knowledge of
Basque, Irish, and Welsh, the α proportions. We also have observations of the
measures of actual use of B. To test empirically the validity of this hypothesis,
we build the function x∗(α) that tells us the evolutionary stable Nash equilibrium
associated to each α ∈ (0, 1).23 Based on x∗(α), we, then build empirical models
which will predict the street and daily use of B of equilibrium. We test the validity
of the hypothesis by studying how good those predictions fit the observed data.24
3 A Behavioural Theory for the Nash Equilib-
rium Function
To build the Nash equilibrium function x∗(α) we need to develop a theory which
would convert (1) into an econometric model from which one can estimate empirical
predictive models. But notice that x∗ is obtained for a given α and constant m, n
and c. One can easily argue and empirically show that this is too strict for being
considered a realistic model. To prove this, we have made elsewhere the exercise of
predicting the use of B based on the model of x∗ with m, n and c constant. We
show that the model adapts badly to all observed data, and was rejected throughout
by nonparametric tests. Furthermore, for m, n and c constant, x∗(α) is a strictly
increasing and concave function that can hardly be justified by economic theory. So
we need to take care of the parameters m, n and c.25
22The following comments of the Secretary of Linguistic Policy for Basque, after the V Sociolin-
guistic Survey, are relevant: “In the last twenty years the use of Basque in the family has decreased
one per cent.” Baztarrika (2014). For the Surveys of Basque, see Appendix 6.1.
23You may consider α as an exogenous variable because its changes are mainly due to factors re-
lated to cultural identity, and the responsibility in transmitting the language to future generations.
The existence of a public bilingual educational system produces a continuous flow of bilinguals that
changes α. This means that the Selten and Pool (1991)’s argument of communicative benefits as
the driving force to invest in the learning of a language hardly applies here.
24Note that x∗(α) and the predicting functions of language B-use, called PKE(α) and PDU(α)
below, are not the same. You can only identify and estimate PKE(α) and PDU(α), not x∗(α).
25Since there are no data that allow to test some of the arguments we will use in the following,
one can only test the finally resulting model. This is a problem shared by probably all papers
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Notice that one can think of n as the natural pay-off level get by monolinguals, and
by the bilinguals who voluntarily choose language A. Therefore, we may assume
that n is not sensitive to α, and limit to the modelling of m and c.
The theory for x∗(α) is based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s psychological
reference point, which is a cornerstone in behavioural economics. Bilinguals may
have different views and expectations about factors that might affect the status of
the minority language. They would assign different probabilities to the event of, say,
language shift, they may also have different views about when B is out of danger,
or when a bilingual society is achieved.26 They may also differ on how much their
experienced utility27 (see Kahneman et al., 1997) is increased when coordinating in
B, that is, m, and on the loss of utility when forced to switch to A, that is, c. Our
view is that all the differences in perceptions and expectations bilingual individuals
might have, are conditioned by the differences in the sociolinguistic contexts in which
they are immersed. By sociolinguistic context we refer to an area with a specific
proportion of bilinguals, and thus a certain presence of language B in the workplace,
streets, etc. (each context has a linguistic landscape; see Landry and Bourhis, 1997)
which clearly depends on α. For instance, the sociolinguistic context of the heavily
industrialized metropolitan area of Bilbao (23% of Basque speakers and a KE of
2.5% ) is quite different from that of, say, San Sebastian-Donostia (with 40.6% and
15.2%, respectively). The same applies to the context of Dublin city and suburbs
(32.8.2% of Irish speakers, and a DU of 1.3%) relative to the towns and villages
of the Gaeltacht areas, such as Galway and suburbs (41.4%, and 3%, respectively).
Similarly, Cardiff (11.0% and 4.86%, respectively) relative to Gwynedd (66.75% and
66.75%, respectively). It would be highly unrealistic to assume that m and c, are
not sensitive to the sociolinguistic contexts, i.e. to changes in α; or, equivalently,
that they are the same in different municipalities and areas with different α.
Our theory assumes that each bilingual individual is adapted to some sociolinguistic
context of B in relation to A, in the context of a globalised society. The intuition is
based on a basic tenet of Kahneman and Tversky (1979): “Our perceptual apparatus
is attuned to the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the evaluation of
absolute magnitudes. When we respond to attributes such as brightness, loudness,
or temperature, the past and present context of experience defines an adaptation
level, or reference point, and stimuli are perceived in relation to reference point [...].
testing economic theory with data. The best we can do here is to develop a theory based on
stylized facts, and fundamental concepts of behavioural economics.
26By bilingual society we mean a society where almost all individuals speak or at least understand
A and B, and the obstacles to use B are removed.
27That is, the hedonic experience associated with speaking B or the painful experience of being
forced to use A. Henceforth, we will use indistinctly ‘experienced utility’ and ‘utility’.
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Thus, an object at a given temperature may be experienced as hot or cold to the
touch depending on the temperature to which one has adapted. The same principle
applies to non-sensory attributes such as health, prestige, and wealth.”
We apply this idea to the perception of bilinguals about the minority language B.
In a language contact context, the frequency with which a bilingual experiences
meeting another bilingual in the past determines an adaptation level or reference
point. This adaptation conditions the bilingual’s expectations of the same event in
the future, and of the status of B. It will condition too his experienced utility of
speaking B. Each sociolinguistic context will shape a specific reference point for him.
Thus, the bilinguals’ similarity of behaviour is sociolinguistic context dependent.
Where α is high, the event of two bilinguals matching and speaking in B is fairly
frequent. In those contexts bilinguals will be adapted to that frequency. If B is
the dominant language of communication of a sociolinguistic context, the utility
bilinguals experience cannot be far from the payoff n, i.e. bilinguals’ utility m would
be near n. Equivalently, in that sociolinguistic contexts the bilingual would not suffer
a perceptible utility loss due to being forced to use A when meeting, eventually, a
monolingual. That is, we would assume that then c would be ‘almost’ zero.
In general, speakers of a minority language in a contact situation, satisfying A.1,
tend to feel a certain level of latent frustration caused by the permanent difficulties of
keeping the language alive. When the proportion of bilinguals is low, the probability
of matching between bilinguals is low, and so the probability of speaking in B could
even be smaller. The bilinguals of that kind of context would be adapted to those
frequencies. The lack of use of B, and the overwhelming presence of A, induce some
individuals to loose language skills and competence in B. But others will try to
escape by building ways to meet other bilinguals and satisfy their wish of speaking
B. So they make the effort of creating clubs of B speakers, spend personal time and
effort for organising activities in their leisure time (music gigs, drama productions,
talks, sports, language teaching for adults, and other events), just for the pleasure
of speaking B, and feeling that they are part of a cultural identity28. Clearly, the
experienced utility felt by these bilinguals when they speak B must be high.
If we take into account different municipalities or areas of the countries or regions
under study, we get a rich set of values of α, representing the variety of sociolinguistic
contexts for B; that is, we assume α ∈ (0, 1).29 We summarize the above as follows:
28These types of clubs abound in the countries under study. In the Basque Country they take
the name of Mintzalagunak “Speak with Friends”; in Ireland are called Na Gaeil O´ga GAA Club;
and in Wales Mentrau Iaith Cymru.
29We take the open unit interval (0, 1) as representing all the variety of sociolinguistic contexts
of the country.
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Let α∗L ∈ (0, 1) denote a hypothetical proportion of bilinguals which the present
bilinguals of the sociolinguistic context L think it would convert L into a bilingual
society30. Thus, α∗L represents the aspiration for the bilinguals of L
31.
A.4. Let S(αL) = α
∗
L be the function that describes how the bilinguals of context
L determine their aspiration α∗L, given the present αL to which they are adapted
to (1 > α∗L > αL > 0). We assume that S is a continuous, concave, and strictly
increasing function in α.
Remark: Since aspiration levels will differ due to the heterogeneity of sociolinguistic
contexts, we can assume that the distance between the smallest aspiration level α∗L
and the highest one α∗
L
is small 32. Then we choose the highest one to represent the
aspiration level of the whole bilingual population, and denote it as α∗ < 1. It may
happen that for a small community of bilinguals of some area L, α∗ is infeasible or
out of reach, due to the cultural and sociological constraints of that area. It is well
known experimentally and theoretically, that unavailable choices have an important
influence on the decision behaviour of agents, known as aspiration effects (Begum
et al. 2016, and Begum and Richter, 2015). The higher the distance between the
actual αL and α
∗, the higher the aspiration effect. Then B would be perceived in
a more intense way in contexts with low presence of bilinguals, and some of them
would volunteer to do extra work to save the language in this area (as observed).
A.5. The experienced utility of speaking language B, is a real valued continuous
function, denoted m(α), that strictly decreases with α. As α tends to the bilinguals’
aspiration α∗, m(α) tends to the ”natural” pay-off level n.33
The latent frustration mentioned above becomes explicit when the bilingual meets
a monolingual. When this occurs, the level of frustration felt will depend on the
proportion α, which is the reference proportion or adaptation level for that bilingual.
We denote the (explicit) frustration felt in that matching as c(α). The reasons given
above lead us to make the following assumption.
A.6. The frustration cost of being forced to use A is a real valued continuous func-
tion, denoted c(α), that strictly decreases in α.
30That is, a place, where there would be ‘almost’ no obstacles to the social use of B. It should
not be a forecast based on sophisticated techniques. It could only be a projection of desires to
overcome the difficulties faced by language B in the present.
31In a choice problem, the aspiration represents the most desired alternative, available or not.
Hence, at α∗L the bilinguals, with context L’s preferences, feel satisfied.
32That is,
∣∣∣α∗
L
− α∗L
∣∣∣ ≤ ε, for ε > 0 small. This would imply a extreme concave curvature of the
S function,
33Most likely, there would be a small interval of low levels of α > 0, in which m will be increasing
in that interval. But for the greatest part in the domain of α ∈ (0, 1), m(α) is monotonically
decreasing. Nothing relevant is lost by keeping A.5 as it is.
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4 The econometric models
The next step is to apply A.1-A.6 for building an econometric model which we
can be used for testing our model along the observed data. We first specify x∗ to
construct predictors for the expected KE and DU along our theory model.
4.1 From Nash equilibrium function to language use models
We complete the building of x∗ as a function of α by specifying m and c as simple
functions satisfying A.4-A.6. Let us suppose that m(α) is a simple decreasing
function of type K
α
, where K > 0 is a constant. For any α < α∗ we get m(α) > n
such that a bilingual speaker get a positive profit whenever he coordinates in B.
Profits would be zero when the language is normalized, in the sense m(α∗) = K
α∗ = n.
Then for α < α∗ < 1, and a given value of n, we get K = α∗n < n , and so the
weighted profit b(α) = (m(α)− n) α
(1−α) is a decreasing function.
Assumption A.3 reads now as follows: for any α < α∗, the frustration cost function
is strictly smaller than the weighted benefit function:
c(α) < (m(α)− n) α
1− α
This condition allows the use of language B in equilibrium (IU). Then
c(α) = (m(α)− n) α
(1− α) − b˜(α) (2)
for some b˜(α) > 0 denoting the net benefit. Inserting equation (2) in (1) we obtain
x∗(α) =
α(m(α)− n)− c(α)(1− α)
α(m(α)− n) =
b˜(α)(1− α)
α(m(α)− n) ,
and substituting m(α) = K
α
gives
x∗(α) =
b˜(α)(1− α)
K − nα . (3)
Equation (3) shows how the predicted equilibrium proportion of the bilingual popu-
lation playing R changes with α. The denominator is positive because m(α) = K
α
>
n for all 0 < α < α∗. Hence x∗ = x∗(α) > 0, and it is increasing in α if b˜(α) is
not decreasing faster than 1−α
α(m(α)−n) is increasing.
34 So one would assume that the
net benefit function b˜(α) has a well defined first derivative. Finally, let bˇ := b˜/n
34The first derivative of g(α) = 1−αα(m(α)−n) with respect to α is g
,(α) = n−K(K−nα)2 . Hence, for
α < α∗ < 1, g,(α) > 0 since K = α∗n < n.
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denote the relative net benefit (recall, n is constant). Substituting K = nα∗ in the
denominator of (3), we get
x∗(α) =
bˇ(α)(1− α)
(α∗ − α) . (4)
Since x∗(α) is an interior equilibrium, that is, x∗(α) ∈ (0, 1), we have bˇ(α)(1−α) <
(α∗ − α), where 1 > α∗ > α > 0, and hence 0 < bˇ(α) < 1.
We capture A.6 with the specification bˇ(α) = β1(α
∗ − α)β2 for unknown β1, β2.
We specify α∗ = αβ3 for unknown β3. For the model to make sense, we work with
restrictions β1 > 0 and 0 < β3 < 1. Then (4) is converted into
x∗(α) = β1(1− α)(αβ3 − α)β2−1 . (5)
As mentioned, our data of use, KE and DU , refer to different things: street use
and daily use, respectively. This requires different modelling for KE and DU , the
former being more challenging, as we will see.
Model 1: Having in mind (1), the model of expected KE is obtained by looking
at the probabilities of random matches of bilinguals (if a monolingual is involved,
A is used anyhow) in which an R player does participate. That is, the probability
of a random match where an R player meets another R player (α2 x∗2), plus the
probability that an R addresses an H player (α2x∗(1 − x∗)), plus the probability
that an H addresses an R player (α2(1− x∗)x∗). In sum,
E[KE|α, x∗] = α2 (2x∗ − x∗2) . (6)
This is the result of an R player who takes the role of leader (as a speaker or as
a responder) in the language B coordination process. When he meets a bilingual,
then they speak in B. An R player will lead the coordination process in any player
role or position (row or column) in the game. Let us call him strong R-player.
In real life however, we find bilinguals who sometimes lead the language B coordina-
tion process, and sometimes are led. The reason is because bilinguals are aware that,
in order to satisfy their preference for the use of B requires being always the leader
in the coordination. But that role is very demanding. As mentioned, R is a risky
choice since you may suffer a frustration if you meet a monolingual, and thus, get
the minimum payoff, n− c. Further you may upset the monolingual and introduce
tension in the dialog alignment. It is natural then that a bilingual will try to avoid
being seen as rude or impolite. We should also have in mind that any bilingual has
a prior information about the rates of failure and success in the coordination in B.
That personal experience will shape his actual behaviour, which moves him to be
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more flexible, combining the R and H strategies. Thus, in practise, the following
model might be more realistic.
Model 2: Without loss of generality, we assume that in 50% of all his conversations
the bilingual starts the conversation. He certainly does so in B. The other 50% are
started by the other person, and he answers in whatever language is used by the
first speaker. We may call this bilingual a weak R-player.
The resulting expected KE is the sum of the probability of a random match where
an R player meets another R-player (α2 x∗2), plus the probability that an R-player
addresses an H player (α2x∗(1− x∗)), i.e.
E[KE|α, x∗] = α2x∗2 + α2x∗(1− x∗) = α2x∗ . (7)
Model 3: For modelling the expected daily use, DU , it is assumed that almost
all individuals that play strategy R will answer (in the census or survey) that they
use B every day, whereas almost all individuals playing strategy H will answer that
they do not. Deviations from these rule should cancel out in average. Consequently,
the expected DU is simply
E[DU |α, x∗] = αx∗ . (8)
We propose the following theory models:
Hypothesis 2. Let α denote the proportion of bilingual speakers in a certain soci-
olinguistic context. Then
Model 1: PKE1(α) = α
2(2x∗ − x∗2) is the predicted street use of B in that context
if the choosers of the R strategy are strong.
Model 2: PKE2(α) = α
2x∗ is the predicted street use of B if the choosers of R are
weak.
Model 3: PDU(α) = αx∗ is the predicted daily use.
Note that, as already indicated, the data allow us to test our hypothesis (say, Propo-
sitions 1 and 2) only as a whole, not separately.
Using (5), we substitute x∗ in the three models, and get:
PKE1(α) = α
2
{
2β1(1− α)(αβ3 − α)β2−1 −
(
β1(1− α)(αβ3 − α)β2−1
)2}
, (9)
PKE2(α) = α
2β1(1− α)(αβ3 − α)β2−1 , (10)
PDU(α) = αβ1(1− α)(αβ3 − α)β2−1 . (11)
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These are the models we will study empirically for Basque, Irish and Welsh. In order
to estimate them from the samples {KEcti, αcti}ncti=1, {DUcti, αcti}ncti=1 for language
sample c in year t one might consider either
KEcti = PKEcti + εcti , DUcti = PDUcti + cti , (12)
(and analogously for DU) or, as a model with multiplicative structure,
log(KEcti) = log(PKEcti) + ε˜cti , log(DUcti) = log(PDUcti) + ˜cti . (13)
This is done by least squares under the constraints that β1 > 0 and 0 < β3 < 1. Note
that models (12) and (13) require different assumptions on the (random) deviations
from the mean. They are, however, not testable, so that we have no particular a
priori preference. While the general findings are quite similar resulting from one
or the other estimation strategy, predicting the language use from the logarith-
mic version (and consequently ̂log(KE) or ̂log(DU)) is somewhat more complex
as one has to correct for the - in our case heteroscedastic - error dispersion since
E[log(KE)|α] < logE[KE|α]; the same holds certainly for DU . Also, the data fits
when looking at the untransformed data did not look very convincing. We therefore
give the least square estimates resulting from model (12). All estimates are given
together with nonparametric fits of KE (DU) on α using local linear estimators and
local bandwidths35 with Epanechnikov kernel; see Appendix for details.
4.2 Empirical Results
The presentation of results concentrates on the predictive functions, as these are in
the centre of our interest. The parameters have no interesting interpretation, and
are therefore deferred to the Appendix 6.3 and 6.4. While the 99% confidence bands
of the functions are very narrow, the 95% confidence intervals for the parameter
estimates are quite wide due to extremely high correlations (not shown) between the
parameter estimates. These, like standard errors and the p-values of our test, are
estimated by wild bootstrap. In Figures 2 to 4 the thick solid line is the model based
estimate with confidence bands indicated by thin solid lines. The dashed lines are the
nonparametric fits, and the grey circles indicate the recorded observations. To see
better the curvature, we have also plotted a 45o line, and a horizontal line at α = 0.
The functions are estimated from different samples taken from the sources discussed
in Section 2. For Basque we have data from between 53 to 175 municipalities per year
35Specifically, we used the command locfit of the R-package ’locfit’ with degree 1 and nearest
neighbour fraction set to 0.25 for Basque and Welsh, but the 0.7 for Irish due to the extremely
asymmetric distribution. These settings were also used for the test statistics.
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(from Soziolinguistika Klusterra), for Irish from about 180 so-called ’local electoral
areas’ obtained from different censi, and for Welsh from 22 local authorities, cf.
Tables 2 to 4 in the Appendix.
Figure 2: Solid lines: PKE for Basque, thick line is the estimate, thin lines give the
99% confidence bands. The dashed lines are nonparametric kernel regression fits.
Figure 3: Solid lines: PDU for Irish, thick line is the estimate, thin lines give the
99% confidence bands. The dashed lines are nonparametric kernel regression fits.
For both, Basque and Irish we see that, over time, the functions are quite stable,
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Figure 4: Solid lines: PDU for Welsh, thick line is the estimate, tin lines give the
99% confidence bands. The dashed lines are nonparametric kernel regression fits.
even over a period of almost 25 years.36 The PDU for Welsh is almost parallel
to the 45o line. When α is above 0.6, i.e. bilinguals are a clear majority, then the
function immediately shifts to the 45o line. All model-based estimates come very
close to the nonparametric (i.e. model-free) data fits, except maybe for extreme
values and outliers. In particular, most of the time the confidence bands include
the nonparametric fit. All this clearly confirms our theory discussed in the previous
sections, and thus, supports our extended LUG model.
Further, for Irish we see a clear difference compared to Welsh and Basque. The
latter two have a more intensive use than Irish, which seems to be shifted away. For
Basque, it even seems that the curvature is getting closer to the 45o line; this is
studied further below. But before doing so, we complete the empirical study of our
hypothesis, Propositions 1 and 2, by another formal test. We say ‘another’ since the
provision of confidence bands is equivalent to a particular statistical test.
More specifically, we apply the nonparametric specification test of Ha¨rdle and Mam-
men (1993) which takes as test statistic the Euclidean distance between the smoothed
version of the model-based parametric fit and the nonparametric fit. The ‘smoothed
version’ means that the parametric fit gets convoluted with the same kernel and
bandwidth we used for the nonparametric fit to avoid rejecting our hypothesis sim-
ply because of a smoothing bias inherited by the nonparametric fit. Then the boot-
strap p-values are: for Basque 0.728 for 1993, 0.408 for 1997, 0.559 for 2001, 0.054
for 2006, 0.479 for 2011, and 0.003 for 2016. For Irish 0.055 for 2002, 0.032 for 2006,
and 0.095 for 2011; and for Welsh we get a p-value of 0.075 for 2005 and 0.080 for
2014. This, together with the graphs, indicate that the model adapts reasonably
36For Ireland we mainly refer to 2006 and 2011 because of the uncertainty concerning the mea-
surement of DU before 2006. People may use every day Irish only at school, but elsewhere choose
strategy H. Only since 2006 there is a clear definition of DU outside the educational system.
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well to the observed data. The reason for the low p-values in some years, that can
also be detected in the pictures, is due to the α values for which the nonparametric
line is far outside the confidence bands.
To calculate the p-values, uniform confidence bands, standard errors and confidence
intervals, we generated 1000 bootstrap samples {Y ∗i , αi}ni=1 where Y ∗i := Ŷi+(Yi−Ŷi)·
εi with Yi being KEi (or DUi), Ŷi our estimated prediction model, and εi randomly
drawn from a standard normal37. Then, for example the uniform confidence bands
for PKE were constructed in the following way. Define
T := sup
α∈(0,1)
|PKE(α)− P̂KE(α)|/σy(α)
with σ2y(a) = V ar[P̂KE(a)]. It can be shown that its bootstrap analogue
T ∗ := sup
α∈(0,1)
|PKE∗(α)− P̂KE∗(α)|/σ∗y(α)
is converging in distribution to T . Consequently, from our bootstrap samples we
can obtain any quantile qT of T . The formula P̂KE(α) ± q∗Tσ∗y(α) provides us
with uniform confidence bands at any wanted quantile. The confidence bands (as
the confidence intervals) can be asymmetric because they are calculated by this
bootstrap method, and therefore reflect the asymmetry of the distributions of our
estimators.
These uniform bands are very useful as the nonparametric test simply tells us
whether the theory model has a low p-value or not; it does not tell us where a
potential problem is. In our case, the bands provide us with the information that
there is not a general, systematic deviation of our theory model from the nonpara-
metric fit. In fact, apart from outlier problems on the right hand side of the Irish
data, the low p-values for Basque in 2016 and Irish in 2006 are due to an ’elbow’
of the real data (respectively the nonparmaetric fit) at around α = 0.5, i.e. when
bilinguals become the majority.
We said above that Irish is almost shifted, whereas the use of Basque is quite stable.
Having made these observations, it would be interesting to contrast them with the
development of α and KE (or DU) over time. The box-plots (left panels) in Figures
5-7 illustrate the development of the distributions over the years. Recall that we are
looking at all combinations (αti, KEti) without weighting them by the population
size of municipality i. This explains why it seems that the percentage(s) of bilingual
37We also checked with centred and normalised chi-square to guarantee non-negative responses
(Pendakur, Scholz, Sperlich, 2010), and a two-point distribution (Ha¨rdle, Mammen, 1993) to
account better for potential asymmetries. We present the version with standard normal εi as these
seem to calibrate best nonparametric test for moderate sample sizes, see Sperlich (2014).
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Figure 5: The development of α and street use of Basque over time.
Figure 6: The development of α and daily use of Irish over time.
speakers went down, though the real total percentage has steadily increased, see
Table 1. We see that all years exhibit a huge dispersion for α and KE (less so DU),
with no stabilization of the distributions of these indicators. We observe a shrinking
number of municipalities with small α and/or small values of KE. This might
Figure 7: The development of α and daily use of Welsh over time.
24
explain why people feel that α has to increase much more to become a normalized
language (β3 is converging to zero from above!). What we see in the right panels is
the development of PKE and PDU over time. The tendency is clear: for Irish it
went down dramatically from an almost low level, whereas for Basque it is steadily
increasing. As for Welsh we only have two points in time which certainly give
different results; thus, we prefer not to interpret the observed change.
We close this empirical analysis by noting that we also run estimations and test for
Model 1, and for x∗ with m and c constant, as well as with other flexible net benefit
functions allowing to violate one of our assumptions. They neither fit better but get
smaller p-values. All these results are provided on request. We can conclude that
we could not find any empirical evidence against our theory based model.
5 Conclusions
This paper has taken an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to analyse the ob-
served erosion in the minority language use in modern multilingual societies, like the
Basque Country, Ireland and Wales (the benchmark societies). Certainly, manifold
factors could influence a minority culture, such as the developments of information
technologies, globalization and international market integration. Olivier et al.(2008),
Bisin and Verdier (2010) and (2014) study the impact of international integration
on cultural identities with the cultural dynamics model of Bisin and Verdier (2001)
interacting with a model international trade equilibrium. We do not deny the influ-
ence of globalization on cultural identities. However, on a more specific level, such
as the analysis of minority language use, we rather take an internal view, focusing,
as suggested by the Council of Europe, on the speaker of the minority language B,
i.e., the bilingual individual, and the factors that might shape his language choices.
Our model shows that the bilingual population dynamics converge into an (inte-
rior) evolutionary stable Nash equilibrium (i.e., a linguistic convention), x∗, that
denotes the equilibrium fraction of bilinguals who choose pure strategy Reveal(R).
In this equilibrium, when pairs of bilinguals playing Hide(H) are matched, with
probability (1 − x∗)(1 − x∗), they will shift to speak in the majority language A.
Since the strategies R and H have equal expected payoffs, the linguistic convention
is compatible with any value of x∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then it is possible that H could create
a positive feedback loop; that is, more bilinguals would choose it, increasing 1− x∗.
As a result, a convention with a relatively low fraction of R choosers may, by im-
itation learning, expand through the bilingual population, reaching domains where
asymmetric information does not exist, such as family, and assortative matchings.
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Hence, we have a theoretical explanation for the erosion observed in the minority
language use. To test the theory, we build three empirical equilibrium models, each
giving rise to an increasing and convex relation between the proportion of bilinguals,
α, in each context and the predicted use of B in equilibrium38. We show that these
equilibrium functions explain very well the observed data for all languages and years.
They are quite stable over time, for each language, and the performed nonparametric
tests do not reject our model. The empirical result is that the extended LUG is a
solid model to analyse the erosion in the use of language B.
One wonders why bilinguals could behave in that (paradoxical) way? The strategic
analysis of language use of this paper throws light to understand this behaviour.
It is well known that human language is guided by economizing attitudes39, and
the principles of least effort, see Zipf (1949).40 Our framework points in the same
direction. More specifically, contrary to the strategy R, the chooser of H minimizes
potential frictions with monolinguals, and takes a passive role in determining the
language of interaction. Further, H avoids the frustration cost c. Thus, it should not
be a surprise that bilinguals might converge into a linguistic convention in which the
least effort demanding strategy H is chosen by a relevant fraction of the bilingual
population which, in turn, would result in a decrease in the use of B.
Since the goal is to increase the use of B, our model suggests that the main policy
target should be to increase x∗(α). Therefore, all the elements entering into equa-
tion (3) should be taken into account: α(m(α) − n), c(α) and α. Needless to say,
the imperfect information should be minimized. In fact, its influence on minority
language use has been neglected in language economics (see Ginsburgh and Weber,
Ed., 2016), sociolinguistics (Bayley, Cameron and Lucas, Ed., 2013), and in the
theories developed after the Abrams and Strogatz (2003)’s model (see Patriarca et
al., 2012). There are simple ways to transmit information, like the Cymraeg badges
proposed by the Welsh Language Commission so that Welsh speakers would recog-
nize each other. But this kind of signalling could be controversial. For example, it
would not be politically accepted in the Basque Country. Indeed, the type of sig-
nalling (verbal or non verbal) can only be adopted if it has a wide social consensus.
Verbal signalling could be more complicated. Linguistic planners could consider the
38It could be argued that intuition might suggest that the predictive functions should be increas-
ing and convex. However, these two properties alone cannot explain the variation observed in the
data. There is, still, plenty of space for model mis-specification.
39Characterized by the optimization of the difference between communication benefits and the
costs attached to the speech production (in each of the two active language system, in the case of
a bilingual): memory, word length, utterance length, frequency and other factors; see Frank and
Goodman (2012).
40These features are also confirmed by Selten and Warglien (2007) in their experiment on the
emerging of an artificial language.
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monolinguals as potential allies. To this end, careful pondered introductory phrases
could be designed, to be used by bilinguals to convey the desire to speak B; also,
well thought answers should be chosen for the monolinguals to convey that they do
not feel under pressure nor are embarrassed to confess they do not speak the official
language B. Since the interactions with monolinguals are frequent, their coopera-
tive attitude would make bilinguals to gradually ignore politeness-based choices, and
reveal more openly their type. Friendliness could also alleviate frustration costs.
It might require also language policy measures to increase the bilinguals’ perceived
net benefit of using B. Policies could also highlight the advantages (both cultural
and psychological) of being an active bilingual, taking part in keeping alive language
B and its related culture, and sustain cultural diversity.
A dramatic increase in α is not necessarily the definitive solution to increase the use
of B, as it has been proved by comparing Ireland, Wales, and the Basque Country:
while the percentage of bilinguals in Ireland doubles the one in the Basque Country,
the former is close to extinction while the latter exhibits a fairly stable street use.
One may think that this is because English (the majoritarian language A) is a
stronger competitor for Irish (B) than Castellano and French is for Basque (though
Spanish is after English, Chinese and Hindi the fourth most spoken language in the
world). For this reason we added Welsh which has an α similar to the one of Basque.
Like any model, ours has limitations. There may be other factors outside the model
that hinder the use of B. For example, with the empirical Model 2 we already
capture partially the bilinguals’ politeness behaviour, and find that it explains better
the data of street use of Basque (compared with Model 1). This suggests that
politeness is a relevant feature to understand the use of B. One could extend the
LUG further by introducing explicitly politeness. This would imply a different
theoretical scenario, with different Nash equilibria and linguistic conventions; see
Uriarte (2017) for a preliminary study.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Language Use Data
Note that the proportion of bilinguals in the three languages, denoted α, is obtained
dividing the Number of Bilinguals by the Total Population. For Table 1 this is the
population in the country, and in the Figures in Section 4 it refers to the small
regions (communities, counties, etc). The definition of who is bilingual is set by the
statistical authority in each country. They coincide in that it is the oral competence
what determines whether an individual is qualified as bilingual or not.
- Basque Country: The data about knowledge of Basque can be found in the
Sociolinguistic Surveys (Inkesta Soziolinguistikoa). These surveys are carried out
by the local Government and agencies of each of the three territories where Basque
is spoken: the Basque Autonomous Community, the Navarre Community and Pays
Basque. The population is divided in three groups according to the oral competence
relative to Basque: Bilinguals (those who speak well or fairly well the language),
Passive Bilinguals (those who do not speak well, but understand the language) and
Monolinguals. The VI Sociolinguistic Survey 2016 gathered information from a
sample of randomly chosen 8200 people, aged 16 and over, who answered question-
naire over the phone. See the Basque Government’s gathered data about Basque in:
www.euskara.euskadi.eus/r59-738/eu/contenidos/informacion/argitalpenak
/eu 6092/ikuspegi sozio linguis.html
The Street Surveys are carried out, every five years, by the NGO Soziolinguistika
Klusterra. The street surveyors collect random observations, without any inter-
ference with the subjects observed, just by listening and recording the language of
conversations taking place in public spaces of the above mentioned three Administra-
tive authorities.41 Using random samples of anonymously registered conversations
in the streets at a given time and place, the Street Use Measure (KE ) of minority
language B is the number of individuals observed in conversations speaking language
B out of the total number of individuals observed in conversations in that place. As
a methodological rule, the observers only record conversations in a single language,
cf. A.1. The street use data can be found on www.soziolinguistika.org.
- Ireland: All data were obtained from the web-page of the Irish statistical institute,
http://www.cso.ie/en/census/index.html. However, they clean up and change their
41For the methodological details on how the data is collected, see Altuna and Basurto (2013).
Note that the V. Street Survey in 2006 took place in 62 municipalities with 400 street surveyors
recording 185,316 conversations. In the VII. Street Survey in 2016, 187,635 conversations in 144
municipalities were recorded.
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web-pages regularly, such that the data we downloaded for 1996, 2001/2 and 2005/6
cannot be found that easily anymore. We certainly provide these data on request.
The 2011 data are still available but differently organized. Again we can provide
them on request. For the census 2016 of Ireland, so far only results and statistics
are available, but we did not find the disaggregated data that we needed for our
calculations. In all censi bilinguals are defined as ”Irish speakers aged 3 years and
over”. The daily use, DU, is explicitly observed, after 1996 separated into groups
that daily use Irish ”inside the educational system only” and those who also or
exclusively use it outside the educational system. Certainly we consider the latter
group. As for 1996 this distinction is not at all clear we skipped this wave in the
newer version of our paper.
- Wales: The most reliable source of data about Welsh speakers are the Censi of
Wales. It is not explicitly used the word bilingual as they consider “the number
of people aged 3 and over able to speak Welsh”. Under the heading of “able to
speak Welsh” is included every person aged 3 and over who “Speaks, reads and
writes Welsh” or “Speaks, reads, but does not write” or “Speaks but does not read
or write”. Data about the frequency of use of Welsh are in the WLUS (Welsh
Language Use Surveys). The daily use, DU, is obtained dividing the number of
“daily users” by the total population. Disaggregated data for daily use of Welsh by
local authorities is obtained from Jones (2012). Used sources are:
The Welsh Language Use Surveys of 2004-06. The Welsh Language Board. 2008.
Cardiff.
Welsh Language Use in Wales 2013-15. Welsh Government and Welsh Language
Commissioner. 2015. Cardiff.
Jones, H.M. (2012). A Statistical Overview of the Welsh Language, The Welsh
Language Board. Cardiff.
2001 Census: Report on the Welsh Language. Office for National Statistics, London:
TSO. 2004.
2011 Census. First results on Welsh, Statistical Bulletin 118/2012. Statistics for
Wales.
Additional data: We send two Excel files with data about Irish and Basque. In
the latter case, the headings were written in Basque with English acronyms by the
surveyors who collected the data. The headings in the columns are: Year (1991,
1996, 2001, 2006, 20011 and 2016 when the Sociolinguistic Survey was made), Mu-
nicipality, Bilinguals (Euskaldunak), Passive Bilinguals (Ia Euskaldunak), Monolin-
guals (Erdaldunak); then come the percentages of Bilinguals, Passive Bilinguals,
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and Monolinguals. Year (1993, 1997 2001, 2006, 2011 when the Street Surveys were
made), Street Use of Basque (Euskera Erabilera). In the 2016 Excel file the headings
are: Municipality (Udalerria), Year of the Survey (Neurketa), Bilingual (Gaitasuna),
Sample Size (Lagina), Street Use of basque (Euskera Erabilera).
6.2 Matrix of Expected Pay-offs and Replicator Equation
The matrix of expected pay-offs attached to the LUG is the following:
R H
R α(m− n)− c(1− α), α(m− n)− c(1− α) α(m− n)− c(1− α), α(m− n)
H α(m− n) , α(m− n)− c(1− α) 0, 0
This is a symmetric matrix. Let x be the proportion of bilinguals playing strategy
R. To simplify notation, let h = α(m− n)− c(1− α), and j = α(m− n). Then A
denotes the matrix of pay-offs to the bilingual player in the row position:
A =
[
h h
j 0
]
Since we are dealing with a symmetric two player game, the pay-off matrix to the
bilingual player in the column position, denoted B, will be the transpose of matrix
A: B = AT. Members of the bilingual population are divided in two types, those
who choose pure strategy R, and those who choose H, with proportions x and 1−x,
respectively. The success of a bilingual type is a function of the population state
x = (x, 1− x). Since the LUG is played continuously by pairwise random matches,
we may assume that the state x(t) evolves as a differentiable function of time t. The
rate of increase
•
x/x of the type R depends on the expected pay-offs to strategy R
( that is, Ax) relative to the average expected pay-offs (that is, xTAx). Thus, we
obtain the one-population replicator dynamics equation associated to the LUG, as
follows,
•
x
x
= Ax− xTAx
Clearly
•
x
x
> 0 if Ax > xTAx,
•
x
x
< 0 if Ax < xTAx , and
•
x
x
= 0, otherwise. The
bilinguals who choose H will evolve in the opposite direction to that of R, so there
is no need to indicate the differential equation of 1− •x. Doing the operations shown
in the replicator equation, we obtain the differential equation for the evolution of
the share of bilinguals playing pure strategy R:
•
x = x(1− x)[α(m− n)(1− x)− c(1− α)]
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The rest points for the equation are x = 1, x = 0 and the mixed strategy equilibrium
x∗ = 1 − c(1−α)
α(m−n) . When 0 < x < x
∗, x increases toward x∗, and when 1 > x > x∗,
x decreases toward x∗. Thus, the asymmetric equilibria (R,H) and (H,R) are
unstable, and x∗ is evolutionary stable.
Remarks: The equilibria of the LUG, in the framework of pairwise strategic inter-
actions represented as a symmetric two player game, need the following assumptions:
1. The player role or position in the game does not condition the choice of action.
That is, both the row player (or player I) and the column player (or player II)
will choose freely either R or H. On this issue, see Weibull (1995) and the quoted
references therein.
2. Who is the speaker (or who initiates the conversation), and who is the listener
(or hearer) is not conditioned by the player position nor by the choice of strategy. In
particular, the row (column) player is not necessarily the speaker (listener). An R
chooser (either row or column player) may lead the language B coordination process
either as speaker or as listener. An H chooser is passive in that coordination.
6.3 The Parameter Estimates
Table 2: Parameter estimates (with standard deviations in parenthesis) and 95%
bootstrap confidence intervals (C.I.) for the Basque municipals; obs. indicates num-
ber of observations.
year 1993 1997 2001 2006 2011 2016
β1 .862 (.045) .890 (.027) .946 (.024) 1.07 (.026) .849 (.036) 1.10 (.024)
C.I. [.778;.905] [.857;.929] [.918;1.02] [1.03;1.13] [.776;.934] [1.09;1.17]
β2 .034 (.018) .030 (.015) .003 (.014) .039 (.036) -.191 (.031) .008 (.009)
C.I. [-.002;.070] [.000;.060] [-.019;.035] [-.021;.116] [-.233;-.116] [.000;.033]
β3 .082 (.039) .089 (.024) .011 (.011) .032 (.023) .013 (.023) .001 (.005)
C.I. [.043;.155] [.055;.116] [.000;.036] [.001;.096] [.001;.088] [.000;.015]
obs. 95 116 127 53 74 175
6.4 Nonparametric Estimation procedure
For the ease of notation we always useKE as observed response variable; forDU , the
methodology works exactly the same way. Given a sample {αi, KEi}ni=1 one wants
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Table 3: Parameter estimates (with standard deviations in parenthesis) and 95%
bootstrap confidence intervals (C.I.) for the Irish local election areas; obs. indicates
number of observations.
year 2002 2006 2011
β1 .043 (.012) .007 (.375) .020 (.144)
C.I. [.042;.082] [.007;1.41] [.016;.513]
β2 -1.31 (.080) -1.42 (1.28) -1.02 (.802)
C.I. [-1.32;-1.05] [-1.509;3.04] [-1.15;2.27]
β3 .237 (.043) .317 (.103) .100 (.093)
C.I. [.101;.245] [.035;.514] [.009;.472]
obs. 180 180 200
Table 4: Parameter estimates (with standard deviations in parenthesis) and 95%
bootstrap confidence intervals (C.I.) for the Welsh local authorities. Estimates are
based on 22 observations in 2004-06.
2004-2006 2013-2015
estimate (s.e.) 95% C.I. estimate (s.e.) 95% C.I.
β1 .461 (.046) [.335;.527] .429 (.019) [.391;.475]
β2 -.538 (.048) [-.629;-.425] -.667 (.025) [-.691;-.579]
β3 .004 (.034) [.000;.100] .004 (.007) [.0003;.027]
to estimate the conditional expectation E[KE|α] = g(α) under the assumption
that g(·) is a smooth function having second order Lipschitz continuous derivatives.
The errors v = KE − g(α) have finite variance. One may add some conditions on
the distribution of α if one wants to calculate the statistical properties of the now
described estimator: For a weight or kernel function K(·) for which we chose the
Epanechnikov kernel K(u) = 0.75 · (1 − u2)+ (the subindex + indicates that the
function is set to zero if 1− u2 is negative) and bandwidth hx we take
ĝ(x) = argmin
g,g1
n∑
j=1
(KEj − g − g1 · (αj − x))2K(αj − x
hx
) (14)
as an estimate for g(x). This is the local linear kernel estimator. Letting x run
over the range of α (over all sample observations αi) we can draw than the function
estimate of g(·) which is compared with our model for PKE.
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